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Abstract
What patients reveal in their first person verbal accounts forms the basis 
of the clinical assessment (e.g. PANSS) and Diagnosis (DSM) upon which all 
subsequent research hinges. Much of the rich experience (phenomenology) 
of someone with psychosis does not lend itself to objective methods, yet 
these experiences are those we need to understand if psychological and 
neuroscientific theories are to advance.
In this paper I propose a method, knowledge elicitation, to systematically 
explore patient’s verbal reports of their delusions and other beliefs. The method 
has been well used in psychology to reveal the processes used by experts 
when making decisions in naturalistic situations. The assumption is that patients 
are also experts in how they proceed in evaluating the truth of their own and 
other peoples’ beliefs. Utilizing two case studies it is shown that this method 
can turn up rich information concerning a patient’s skills in deliberating about 
truth and falsity of beliefs and the likelihood that the use of such skills may be 
context specific. When asked to evaluate the beliefs of others, even if these 
include a delusional belief identical to their own, then there is considerably more 
deliberation and greater use of established procedures that expert decision 
maker’s use, resulting in the presentation of greater rationality than would 
otherwise be assumed.
Keywords: Delusions; Rationality; Decision making; Heuristics
addressing the issue raised by Jaspers that, ‘If we want to get behind 
these mere external characteristics into the psychological nature 
of delusion, we must distinguish the original experience from the 
judgment based on it [6] Studying phenomenology (nb the original 
experience Jaspers refers to) presents serious difficulties for scientific 
psychology, since the essence of a phenomenological experience is 
that it is a personal experience (subjective) which is unavailable to 
any external verification (objectification). Hence we are dependent 
on what the patient reports about their experiences. 
The current paper evaluates the reasoning skills of patients who 
have been diagnosed with some form of psychosis and where a 
cardinal symptom is delusion. The recruitment strategy also involved 
achieving at least a 3 rating on the PANSS P1 scale (delusions) , and 
with minimal , or no, disorganization of speech , behavior or affect. 
This last criterion was chosen since the main method, described 
below, involved a semi-structured interview and as such marked 
disorganization would have resulted in poor quality of interviews. 
Through semi-structured interviewing the intention was to examine 
how rational deluded patients can be when evaluating the veracity of 
their beliefs or those of other people, including other people holding 
the identical delusional beliefs as the patient. 
We have followed a well established methodology, namely 
knowledge elicitation [7], which has been utilised with good results 
to elicit the thinking processes used by expert decision makers (e.g. 
fire officers) [8,9,10]. I would argue that just as experts can reveal the 
rationality behind their decisions then so too can people shed light 
on the degree of rationality, or irrationality that leads to one holding 
Introduction
For Jaspers the essential feature that distinguished a delusion from 
an overvalued idea was the lack of understandability for the listener 
[1]. But how has communication broken down in such situations? 
Unlike thought disorder the verbal descriptions are linguistically intact 
but the listener cannot determine whether the patient is describing a 
belief, desire, perceptual distortion or alternatively whether this is an 
error of reasoning [2]. Such a difficulty for the listener means that a 
key criterion of rationality has not been met [3] such, delusions are 
typically regarded as a failure of rationality for example the definition 
of delusion in the DSM-V glossary.
‘A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality 
that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else believes and 
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or 
evidence to the contrary. The belief is not ordinarily accepted by 
other members of the person’s culture or subculture (ie it is not 
an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value 
judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so 
extreme as to defy credibility. Delusional conviction can sometimes 
be inferred from an overvalued idea in which case the individual has 
an unreasonable belief or idea but does not hold it as firmly as is the 
case with a delusion’.
In the light of this perceived irrationality , research designed to 
understand the psychological processes producing , and maintaining, 
delusions has resorted to using well established psychological tests of 
reasoning and decision making [4,5]. Yet we have progressed little in 
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a belief to be true, or false. Indeed as noted by [11]‘… subjective 
experience is ordinarily treated as a realm whereby each person 
has authority over themselves ‘ . The counterargument is that such 
authority will be absent in psychotic patients who lack insight, or who 
have deficient met cognitive capability [12]. Hence the validity of this 
method will be returned to in the discussion.
Method
In studies of experts, the participant is presented with a typical 
situation (e.g. a description of a fire) and through probe questioning 
the interviewer endeavors to elicit from the interviewee the decision 
making steps that were taken when coming to a decision. From these 
case studies it is found that expert decision makers adhere only loosely 
to normative models of decision making. Klein and colleagues have 
put together a model of decision making in naturalistic environments 
[8] called Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) making. Typically 
experts, such as fire fighters, have to find a balance between the times 
spent deliberating to ensure an optimal solution and the need for 
rapid judgment since the problem is likely to worsen with delay. RPD 
can be described as a stepwise process:
Step 1: Pattern matching to a schema followed by schema based 
processing : if the expert is able to match the problem to a typical 
representation in memory (pattern match to schema) then the course 
of action to be taken becomes readily available from information 
associated with that schema (schematic processing).
Step 2: If the situation is unclear then the expert:
i) Seeks more information (evidence accrual) until clarity is 
realized
ii) If this information search fails then use ‘assumption based 
reasoning’, that is match to a likely schema and fill in the knowledge 
gaps from the rich pool of information associated with that schema. 
Others have called this ‘elaborative coding’ [13]. 
iii) If pattern matching remains unsatisfactory then the expert 
uses a story building strategy to mentally simulate the likely events 
leading up to the current situation (mental modelling).
Step 3: Frequently the decision maker will then weigh up the 
pros and cons of the chosen model at this stage, or do so after the 
simulation in Step 4 [13].
Step 4: (mental stimulation). Following Step 2/3the course of 
action for a mental model will be tested out through mental simulation 
in order to consider likely consequences, more particularly whether 
the desired goal(s) will be realized, and whether there are likely to 
be unintended consequences. Further models and simulations will be 
tested until one is judged satisfactory. However there is little direct 
comparison of options, unlike the Bayesian model of reasoning. 
When a model and its consequences seem satisfactory then that 
forms the basis of the decision.
Psychotic patients asked to evaluate the veracity of the delusional 
beliefs of other patients have been reported to have better insight 
into the irrationality or pathological nature of delusional beliefs, 
even when the other ‘patient’ is the interviewer in a role reversal 
situation [14,15,16]. Thus we sought to evaluate how well patients 
with delusions adhere to a RPD type model.
Procedure
Each patient was initially familiarized in the use of a 5 point 
scale. Above the scale was written ‘How convinced are you that 
these ideas/beliefs are true?. The scale itself consisted of 5 numbers, 
0-4, together with the definition of each number. So 0 was defined 
as ‘Definitely False’ and 4 ‘Definitely True’ with the middle point 2 
defined as ‘Unsure if True or False’. The familiarization was achieved 
through the interviewer referring to 4 different beliefs about common 
knowledge (e.g. I believe that the sky is blue and trees are green). 
Once the interviewee was familiar with using the scale they were then 
presented with their primary delusional belief (Scenario 1 – Own 
Delusional Belief in 1st person) and asked initially ‘How convinced 
are you that your belief that (interviewer describes the primary 
delusional belief) is true?’. A few probe questions were then asked 
starting with the question, “You’ve given it X, which means Y. Can 
you tell me why you gave it an X rating? (X= the number indicated 
on the scale and Y the definition of that number). Thereafter probe 
questions following the guidelines of [7] were asked. A key principle 
of choosing probe questions is to ensure that they are likely to 
elicit, from the interviewee, their own reasons, or decision making 
strategies, without cueing the interviewee for particular reasons or 
decision making procedures. For example use of questions such as 
“Can you tell me why you chose this number rather than a higher 
number?” are structured to call for reasons without cuing a particular 
reason whereas “Would you change your decision if provided with 
more information? “Could not be used to indicate whether the 
interviewee had adopted the RPD decision making strategy of ‘seeks 
more information until clarity is realized’, since this strategy has been 
cued. 
This same procedure was then used with all , or some of the 
following additional scenarios, in each of which the interviewee 
is being asked to judge the truth of someone else’s belief , be it the 
interviewer’s belief or a stranger, and hence referred to as ‘3rd Person’. 
Scenario 2 (Own Delusional Belief in 3rd person): ‘I meet you (in 
a familiar place to the patient) and we are having a chat and I say to 
you that I believe that (patient’s primary delusional belief presented 
as a key belief of the interviewer). How convinced are you that my 
belief is true? ‘. Scenario 3 (Different Delusional Belief in 3rd person): 
‘So we are still sitting talking (in familiar place) and I also tell you that 
I believe that (interviewer introduces a delusional belief of another 
patient). How convinced are you that my belief is true? ‘
Scenarios 4 and 5: The interviewer creates an imaginary scene in 
which the patient is on a train in a country he has never visited. A 
stranger gets on the train at a station, sits opposite the patient, and 
they begin to chat. During the conversation the stranger reports some 
of his beliefs which include the patient’s own belief (Scenario 4) or a 
different delusional belief (Scenario 5). 
A scoring scheme has also been developed using a 0-10 scale 
to rate the use of Steps 1- 4 of the RDP model referred to above. 
However, these results will not be presented here. Instead two case 
studies will be described to demonstrate how this method can be used 
to elicit important information about the natural decision making 
capabilities of deluded patients when evaluating the veracity of their 
own delusions. 
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Results
Case study 1 
This patient had a diagnosis of schizophrenia (DSM-IV criteria) 
which included the following delusions: he believes in the Devil, who 
does not like him, and had 7 visitations from the Devil , even in the 
hospital , and the Devil has caste excrement all over the place. His 
neighbor tried a frontal lobotomy on him. Films frighten him and he 
was watching two films on TV when demons physically threw him off 
the bed, after which he felt a presence, of these demons, which was an 
evil presence.
Scenario 1 - Own delusional belief – 1st person: Interviewer: 
‘How convinced are you that your beliefs, namely that demons 
threw you off your bed and that when this occurred there was an evil 
presence in your room, are true?’
Patient: ‘Definitely true …. (Indicates 4 on the scale) …. It 
happened twice.’
Interviewer: ‘You’ve given it 4 which means definitely true… can 
you tell me why you gave it this rating?’
Patient: ‘Why? Its true….cos I said its true. Never told a lie in my 
life. There are lies and damn lies. We all tell white lies for the greater 
good ….. Not a belief ….it’s the truth.’
Interviewer: ‘Why this number, why not unsure?’
Patient: ‘Cos it’s true ... cos it happened ...’
Interviewer: ‘Can you provide any more details?’
Patient: ‘No….I was the only witness...you can check that the 
‘Seven psychopaths’ was on the TV two weeks ago and ‘Ghost’ was on 
with Demi Moore….’
Scenario 3 - Different delusional belief - 3rd people: Interviewer: 
(relates a story about the two of them meeting in a familiar place and 
then introduces the following narrative), ‘So, I meet you (in familiar 
place) and we are having a chat and during this chat I say to you that 
I believe that I am under surveillance and people are using electronic 
devices called radionics to read my mind and control my thoughts.’ 
Using that scale how convinces are you that that’s true 
Patient: ‘To the best of my knowledge that doesn’t exist but 
what the Americans are doing …what people are up to nowadays ... 
I wouldn’t…..it’s a possibility….it’s not probably true …its difficult 
cos none of these (indicates the ratings on the scale provided) actually 
cover it ..It’s a possibility …I would rate it between a 2 and a 3( ie 
‘Unsure’ or ‘Probably True’)’
Interviewer: ‘2 and a half?’
Patient: ‘……we only use 10% of our brain…actually I change 
that from 2.5 to 2 ... I think I have good perception of what people are 
thinking its only body language.’
Interviewer: ‘What would have to happen to make that definitely 
false?’
Patient: ‘You know how the brain works ...its neurons and 
receptors nothing more than a mass of electric circuits... You… if you 
could tune in ….there is a possibility you could ……well in a way they 
do it already in medicine …. Radio scanning don’t they...You can see 
in Alzheimer’s what areas are active and what not.’
Interviewer: ‘So why not a 4 on that basis?’
Patient: ‘It’s not measuring thinking its only measuring activity 
of the brain’
Independent observers , asked to rate the degree of rationality , 
or quality of decision making in the patients responses in Scenarios 1 
and 3 ( above) invariably report that the rationality or reasoning given 
in response to Scenario 3 is superior . Not only does this example 
empirically demonstrate what many clinicians report anecdotally, 
namely domains of rationality mixed together with others of 
irrationality it provides a systematic method to assess the degree of 
rationality that a deluded patient is capable of. As such it is a useful 
clinical tool to explore the natural decision making skills available to 
the deluded patient. 
Referring to the RPD model we can map out what processes the 
patient uses well and not so well. For example despite the use of probe 
questions in Scenario 1, there was no attempt to go beyond Step 1 in 
the RPD model, and there was no deliberation. Similar to a confident 
expert there was instant pattern matching and an intuitive judgment 
followed, without deliberation [17,18].
In Scenario3 we see the patient using greater  reflection  or 
thoroughness, a mark of deliberate decision making [13]. We can 
observe good examples of Step 2 of the RPD model namely i) seeking 
more information in order to make a definitive judgment and ii) 
assumption based reasoning when the patient says ,‘…To the best of 
my knowledge that doesn’t exist but what the Americans are doing …
what people are up to nowadays ..’ . This phrase indicates uncertainty 
due to recognition of the limits of his knowledge of current advances 
in technology. It also indicates ‘assumption based reasoning’ followed 
by elaborative encoding insofar as the patient has activated schemas 
of the form ‘current forms of available electronic devices ’ from which 
we can presume he elaborates along the lines ‘can any of these devices 
read someone’s mind and control their thoughts ?’. We then see an 
example of the results of Step 4 (simulation) when he says ‘well in a 
way they do it already in medicine …. Radio scanning don’t they...
You can see in Alzheimer’s what areas are active and what not ‘. 
Although the RPD model stresses that experts do not explicitly 
compare alternative models, I would conjecture that what we observe 
here is implicit comparison of two hypotheses. Implicit in the phrase 
‘they can do it already in medicine ……’ is the hypothesis, let’s call 
it H1, that there are technologies that can read someone’s mind 
and control their thoughts together with its null hypothesis, or H0, 
indicated in the phrase‘It’s not measuring thinking its only measuring 
activity of the brain ‘, which can be taken to mean that brain scanners 
do not measure thought, or read peoples’ minds, instead they measure 
brain activity only. 
Case study 2
The patient also met DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia. His 
delusions were multiple. He thought he was under police surveillance 
and that the next door neighbors were doing the surveillance for 
the police. He had delusions of telekinetic skills, for example when 
talking about the police he caused the police siren to wail (in actuality 
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a police siren did wail at just this time). Clouds were attracted to him. 
Because of these abilities he had a grandiose delusion that he was 
akin to Jesus. Also he had robots, or computers, in his head, as well 
as some GPS device so that his neighbors were able to communicate 
with these robots/computers through the GPS tracking device. This 
patient warranted a maximum rating of 7 on the P1 (Delusions) 
scale of PANSS. The delusional theme chosen, that seemed the most 
primary, was that he had robots in his head and his neighbors are 
using GPS to control him.
Scenario 1 - Own delusional belief – 1st person: Interviewer: 
‘‘How convinced are that your beliefs are true that you have robots in 
your head and your neighbors are able to control you by using GPS? 
Patient (points to 4) ‘150%’ 
Probe questions: 
Interviewer: “Can you tell me why you are so convinced that 
these beliefs are true?”
Patient: “It’s because I’m not crazy at all. I’ve never had problems 
of being crazy.”
Interviewer: “Are there things you see that help confirm your 
belief?”
Patient: “There are some things I see, but I can’t tell you because 
you won’t believe me. Sometimes when I say things, things happen, 
like a bird flapping in the window. And like the police, when I started 
talking about the police you could hear the siren, and there’s no police 
round here.” (Police siren in the distance)
Scenario 2 - Own delusional belief in 3rd person: Interviewer: ‘I 
meet you (in a familiar place to the patient) and we are having a chat 
and I say to you that I believe that I have robots in my head and my 
neighbors are able to control me with GPS. How convinced are you 
that my belief is true? ‘ .
Patient: “I’d want to know why they are doing it. First impression 
is that I know there are robots or computers and I’d ask your questions 
to see if you’ve had the same experiences as me with these robots.”
Interviewer: “So there would be some doubt, right?”
Patient: “Yes”
Interviewer: So would you say probably false? Unsure?
Patient: “Unsure ‘(indicates 2).
After several minutes of further interviewing the interviewer then 
presents Scenario 4.
Scenario 4 - Own delusional belief in 3rd person in unfamiliar 
context: Interviewer: ‘Suppose you are on a train traveling across the 
flat Steppes of Russia and the train pulls into a station and a passenger 
gets into your carriage and starts up a conversation with you, and in 
the process he mentions that he has robots in his head that use GPS to 
control him. How convinced would you be that these beliefs are true?’
Patient: ‘It depends’
Interviewer: ‘What does it depend on?’ 
Patient: Is he a spy?
Interviewer: Suppose he is.
Patient: I would rate it as 4 definitely true.
Interviewer: ‘Suppose he was dressed in a grey suit and he was an 
English businessman come to Russia for work purposes.’
Patient: Definitely zero then
The analysis of this patient’s ratings and subsequent probe 
questioning again suggest a fairly good adherence to the RPD model 
just when judging the veracity of the other person’s delusional 
belief. When asked about his own delusion a spontaneous intuitive 
judgment appears to have been made without deliberation. However 
when presented with the 3rd person situation in the familiar setting 
(Scenario 2) the patient seemed to recognize the lack of clarity, need 
for more information followed by ‘assumption based reasoning, 
namely ‘if you’ve had the same experiences as me with these 
robots. In the unfamiliar setting (Scenario 4) he is also aware of 
the uncertainty inherent in the situation when he says, ‘It depends 
‘followed by assumption based reasoning when asking the question, 
‘Is he a spy?’. We can therefore assume pattern matching to an 
internal schema (being a spy) and although the alternative option 
of being a businessman was proffered by the interviewer, the patient 
responded immediately with a completely different rating suggesting 
that he was readily able to match this to a different schema, namely 
a ‘businessman’ schema. Furthermore the pros and cons of different 
schema could be compared (Step 3), albeit with prompting, given the 
robust ratings of 4 followed by 0 respectively for “Is a spy” and ‘Is 
a businessman’. I would argue that it is this adherence to the RPD 
model that confers greater rationality for 3rd person situations 
compared to the 1st person situation. 
What is challenging here is the reference to ‘Is he a spy’. Few 
mentally healthy controls would pattern match to this schema, but 
then few would assume that the conclusion (he has robots in his head) 
could possibly be true. 
Discussion
Human decision making in day-to-day situations appears to 
depend on whether intuitive or deliberate modes of decision making 
are required [17,18]. Frequently the normative model of decision 
making e.g. Bayesian hypothesis testing is either avoided, as in 
intuitive judgment, or is but one part of a series of processes used 
when making a deliberate decision. In many situations people use 
heuristics, that is they match the situation to an internal schema, 
and if there is a good fit then that forms the basis of their judgment 
[18]. For the 2 patients presented in this paper I would suggest that 
when making judgments about their own belief then an intuitive 
or heuristic based judgment is used, whose habit-like quality has 
arisen from being repeatedly positively reinforced, since it provides 
a satisfactory account. When it came to judging the veracity of other 
peoples’ beliefs, including when this ‘other person’ was reporting the 
patients’ own delusional belief, e.g. Case study 2, then a deliberate 
decision making strategy was adopted that involved several steps 
outlined in the RPD model of natural decision making. Thus these 
deluded patients have many of the necessary skills required in order 
to make rational judgments about beliefs, albeit when judging other 
peoples’ beliefs, since they can adhere too many of the steps that 
expert decision makers use. 
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One caveat mentioned earlier was the use of self report of decision 
making. Introspection about reasons for one’s actions have frequently 
been criticized for their inaccuracy [19]. However using knowledge 
elicitation has revealed much about naturalistic decision making that 
laboratory based experiments was unable to reveal. 
It is very possible that these 2 case studies were exceptional. 
Indeed there is evidence that people with good working memory and 
executive ability engage more in deliberate decision making and are 
more likely to adopt normative decision making techniques such as 
directly comparing the expected utility of options [13]. As a result 
we might expect poor use of an RPD type approach in a significant 
proportion of psychotic patients when making judgments in these 
third person situations. 
Nevertheless the approach taken here has been able to demonstrate 
that the communication disorder that leads to judgments about the 
irrationality of patients with delusions should be restricted to certain 
domains of belief and the domains of rationality and irrationality can 
be explored using knowledge elicitation methods.
Finally a comment on the method used to learn how deluded 
patients go about evaluating the truth or falsity of their beliefs. I 
argued that we can consider that one’s evaluation of the truth of a 
belief can be thought of as a cognitive process similar to decision 
making, an approach that has frequently entered cognitive theories of 
psychosis [7,5] more particularly those that Endeavour to explain the 
positive symptoms of hallucination, and delusion. Nearly all of this 
research has opted for contrived laboratory based tasks in order to 
control the multiplicity of potential independent variables. I argued 
in the Introduction that there is a fundamental flaw in this method 
and that a more naturalistic approach might offer one alternative 
approach, but that the method needed to be systematic in order to 
apply the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model to evaluate 
the quality of decision making of deluded patients when reasoning 
about their beliefs. I would argue that the case studies presented here 
demonstrate the merits of both the systematic interview method 
together with the RPD model to explore the decision making skills 
of deluded patients when they evaluate the truth, or falsity, of their 
beliefs. This is but one goal when interviewing patients to understand 
the psychological processes that cause delusional beliefs. Alternative 
hermeneutic approaches have studied very different research 
questions ranging from patient perceptions of the causes of their 
paranoid beliefs [20], through personal meanings of their delusional 
experiences [21] to the social constructionist position in which the 
plausibility or implausibility of delusional beliefs is shown to result 
from the reality negotiated between patient and clinician, rather 
than an objective external reality unavailable to the patient [8]. Each 
approach explores, with deluded patients, their interpretation of 
their delusional belief, or the experience leading to this belief, but 
since the research questions at outset are different then so too do 
the content and form of the interviews, together with the associated 
analyses, differ in order to address the particular research questions 
[22]. One weakness of the current semi-structured interview is that 
it is unable to determine what experiences might have provided the 
relevant material upon which the belief has been formed, and hence 
whether the reasons offered for that belief are consistent with that 
experience. If the qualitative differences between experiences in the 1st 
and 3rd person contexts are so distinct, then this may well provide the 
explanation for why patients adhered to the RPD model to evaluate 
their delusional belief when presented in the third person context, but 
not when they Endeavour to explain their first person world. 
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